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Abstract. Our main goal is the generalization of the approach of Jobson and Korkie(1984) for funds 
performance evaluation. Therefore, we consider the portfolio selection problem of an investor who 
faces short sales restrictions when choosing among F different investment funds and assume the in-
vestor's utility function to be of the HARA type. We develop a performance measure and discuss its 
relationships to Treynor(1965), Sharpe(1966), Jensen(1968), Prakash and Bear(1986), and Grinblatt 
and Titman(1989). Particular attention is given to the special case of cubic utility implying skewness 
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1. Introduction 
Investors use performance measures for choosing among alternative funds engagements. In 
general, there are two possible ways to tackle the problem of the development of new per-
formance measures. On the one hand, one can choose a partial-analytical framework, thereby 
focusing on the decision problem of a given investor for given expectations and neglecting 
any kind of general capital market considerations. On the other hand, one can analyze capital 
market price formation processes in order to derive conclusions with respect to the attractive-
ness of certain funds. For example, the well-known capital asset pricing model (CAPM) as in-
troduced by Sharpe(1964), Lintner(1965), and Mossin(1966) may define such a setting. Re-
cent approaches like the ones by Harvey and Siddique(2000), Dittmar(2002) or Fletcher and 
Kihanda(2005) are in particular stressing the relevance of preferences for higher-order return 
moments like skewness and kurtosis in asset pricing models. However, in general one may 
conclude from such equilibrium descriptions that the same performance measure of zero 
should be assigned to all investment funds, just expressing that – compared to direct stock 
holdings – the holding of shares of any fund is irrelevant for any capital market participant. 
 
Although such analyses on capital market levels certainly are apt to create interesting general 
insights, for practical application we prefer a partial-analytical framework as the one sketched 
in Bodie et al(2005), pp. 870-874, for the case of simple mean-variance preferences. This 
means that we focus on the view of a single investor with given preference structures and ex-
pectations who typically acts as a price-taker. If for such an investor the CAPM in fact should 
hold, we would learn this from the investor’s specific expectations. But if this is not true, the 
CAPM (as any other capital market model) is not of immediate relevance for the investor un-
der consideration. Nevertheless there are attempts to derive performance measures even on 
the basis of a capital market equilibrium approach as the one presented by the CAPM. Appar-  
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ently, to keep consistency with capital market requirements only marginal investments in 
funds with out-of-equilibrium returns can be taken into account. Even in this regard a partial-
analytical framework may prove useful as it helps to better understand the relevance of the 
performance measures derived from equilibrium consideration. We therefore will return to 
this aspect later on. 
 
To be more specific with respect to our own approach, we use the framework by Jobson and 
Korkie(1984) as our starting point. Jobson and Korkie(1984) – among other things – consid-
ered an investor at time 0 with mean-variance preferences who chooses among F different (al-
ternative) funds which can each be combined with a fixed reference portfolio P until time 1. 
Moreover, the investor is able to borrow or lend any amount at a riskless interest rate R. This 
last assumption leads to the validity of the well-known two-funds separation theorem first es-
tablished by Tobin(1958). As a consequence of Tobin's separation result, any investor with 
mean-variance preferences should select that fund which offers the highest attainable Sharpe 
ratio of a combination of a fund f with the reference portfolio P. Moreover, Jobson and 
Korkie(1984) verified that the resulting funds ranking according to this optimized Sharpe ra-
tio is equivalent to a ranking according to the square of the so-called appraisal ratio of Trey-
nor and Black(1973). Henceforth, we simply speak of the Treynor/Black measure. In the same 
way the Sharpe ratio will often be called by us the Sharpe measure. 
 
The approach by Jobson and Korkie(1984) therefore presents a portfolio-theoretical founda-
tion of the well-known Treynor/Black measure. Unfortunately there are at least two shortcom-
ings connected with their analysis. First, they did not allow for possible short-sales restric-
tions. As a consequence, the fund f exhibiting the highest square of the Treynor/Black meas-
ure might lead to the highest possible Sharpe measure of accessible portfolios only by being   
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sold short. In general funds cannot be sold short and there is therefore a need for considering 
this additional restriction when developing measures for performance evaluation. This charac-
terizes the first aim of our analysis. 
 
Moreover, as already sketched, there are several studies which underpin the necessity for al-
lowing for more general preferences than the simple mean-variance case. In particular, Levy 
and Markowitz(1979), Kroll et al(1984), Hlawitschka(1994) as well as Breuer and Gürt-
ler(2001) indicate that for high risk aversion and/or the use of options the approximative qual-
ity of mean-variance preferences may be poor. Moreover, the relevance of higher-order return 
moments in portfolio selection models has been emphasized, for example, by Chunhachinda 
et al(1997) and Patton(2004). The analysis by Jobson and Korkie(1984) therefore should be 
broadened to allow for more general preferences. Indeed, Hakansson(1969) and Cass and 
Stiglitz(1970) were able to extend the original two-funds separation theorem to the whole 
class of HARA utility functions, i.e. utility functions with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion. 
This generalization of preferences for the original portfolio selection problem considered by 
Jobson and Korkie(1984) is the second main goal of our paper. 
 
To fulfil these two goals, section 2. formally describes the general portfolio selection problem 
under consideration. As already mentioned, we consider a one-period problem with an inves-
tor just identifying one out of F different funds and optimally combining this one with a direct 
stock investment and riskless lending or borrowing. Certainly, the examination of a situation 
where only one out of F different funds can be chosen is somewhat restrictive. Nevertheless 
such a scenario can be interpreted as a classical asset allocation problem with three classes of 
assets (a fund, direct stock holding and riskless lending or borrowing). As an illustration, this 
decision problem corresponds to the important case of institutional investors relying only on a   
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single fund manager, a not uncommon practice, for example, in the U.K. In addition, it is nec-
essary to define different funds as alternative investments if performance measures for single 
funds shall be derived. Moreover, the analysis of situations with the selection of only one 
fund at a time may be used as a starting point for the examination of more complex portfolio 
selection problems in future work. In fact, our derivations remain valid if we reinterpret f = 1, 
…, F not as single funds but as F different given portfolios of funds. Only the analysis of the 
determination of the optimal combination of a certain set of funds must then be the object of 
further research. 
 
From the basic presentations at the beginning of section 2. we derive generalized versions of 
the classical performance measures suggested by Sharpe(1966), Treynor(1965), and Jen-
sen(1968) for the case of HARA preferences with the last one belonging to the class of period 
weighting measures introduced by Grinblatt and Titman(1989). We show that all these meas-
ures are only border solutions if we exclude short sales of fund shares and equity portfolios. 
For inner optima of the portfolio selection problem we get a performance measure which can 
best be viewed as the generalized Sharpe measure not of a fund itself but of its optimal com-
bination with the reference portfolio P. Moreover, when we refer to the optimized perform-
ance measure we mean one which can be endogenously derived from the investor's portfolio 
selection problem when taking care of border solutions. Section 2. offers a complete descrip-
tion of adequate measures of funds ranking in the case of HARA utility functions for the port-
folio selection problem under consideration. 
 
In section 3. we consider the special case of cubic HARA utility functions and determine the 
special functional form of the Sharpe measure for optimal combinations of an arbitrary fund 
under consideration and the reference portfolio. Prakash and Bear(1986) were one of the first   
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to apply the Three-Moment CAPM by Kraus and Litzenberger(1976) in order to derive a 
modified Treynor ratio recognizing skewness preferences We therefore additionally highlight 
the relationship between their results and the ones of this paper. As stated above, our partial-
analytical framework will help to understand better the relevance of performance measures 
derived from pure capital market equilibrium considerations. 
 
In section 4. we analyze empirically the relevance of funds rankings on the basis of the gener-
alized performance evaluation established in sections 2. and 3. for funds investing in either 
German, British, or French shares. We restrict ourselves to the case of quadratic and cubic 
(HARA) utility. Since there are considerable differences in funds rankings according to the 
several performance measures mentioned above our findings suggest that there is in fact a 
need for an optimized performance measure explicitly recognizing skewness preferences. Sec-
tion 5. concludes. 
 
As is necessarily the case for any theoretical paper our results are based on several proofs that, 
because of space constraints, are in several separate appendices which are available from the 
authors on request. Moreover, it should be mentioned that we assume in our propositions and 
lemmas that the order of differentiation and integration may be exchanged and that all ex-
pected values under consideration exist. 
 
2. Performance measurement in the general case of HARA utility 
We consider an expected utility maximizing investor with an initial endowment W0 at time 0 
who can invest in exactly one of F different funds f = 1, …, F as well as in a portfolio P of 
shares. Moreover, riskless lending or borrowing at a constant interest rate R is possible. For a 
given fund f let x be the fraction of W0 which is invested securely for one period from time 0   
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until time 1 with x < 0 denoting riskless lending The amount  0 y( 1 x )W ⋅ −⋅  will be given to 
the portfolio manager of fund f. The remaining amount  0 (1 y) (1 x) W − ⋅− ⋅  will be invested in 
the portfolio P of equity shares directly available on the capital market. Let Rf and RP be the 
uncertain rates of return of investment fund f and portfolio P and rf as well as rP stand for the 
corresponding excess returns Rf − R and RP − R, respectively. We assume that E[rP] > 0 and 
E[rf] > 0 for all funds f. 
 
Then the investor's excess return on the risk component of the portfolio is 
  fP q yr ( 1 y )r r, s a y , ⋅+− ⋅=  (1) 
and total wealth at time 1 is 
  10 q 0 q W W (x (1 R) (1 x) (1 R r )) W (1 R (1 x) r ) = ⋅ ⋅+ +− ⋅++ = ⋅++− ⋅ . (2) 
The investor faces three decision problems. First the investor has to select an investment fund 
f and then has to determine the optimal values of x and y in order to maximize the expectation 
value of the utility function.  
 
Funds rankings should not be preference-dependent; that is they should only depend on objec-
tive market data. Since we want to rank funds for an investor with the decision problem de-
scribed above we only allow for utility functions which all assure the same kind of funds 
evaluation. From Hakansson(1969) and Cass and Stiglitz(1970) it is known that for certain 
classes of utility functions with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) the optimal value 
for y as well as the assessment of different investment funds does not depend on the specifica-
tion of the investor's preferences. More precisely, a HARA utility function U(a,b) is described 
by an absolute risk aversion 
 
'' '
(a,b) 1 (a,b) 1 1 U( W ) / U( W ) 1 / ( a b W ) −= + ⋅ . (3)   
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HARA utility functions with an identical parameter b belong to the same class. All members 
of such a class lead to the same optimal value for y independent of the preference parameter a. 
As pointed out, e.g. Dybvig and Ross(2003), pp. 629-631, this property of HARA utility func-
tion is the reason for their central relevance in portfolio theory. 
 
The reciprocal of absolute risk aversion, i.e. 
'' '
(a,b) 1 (a,b) 1 U( W ) / U( W ) − , 
is called an individual’s risk tolerance. In the case of HARA utility we get a linear function 
1 ab W +⋅ . As shown by Borch(1960), because of this linearity, pareto-efficient risk sharing 
designs among individuals are linear in terminal wealth for a given class of HARA utility 
functions and thus very easy to establish. This circumstance just highlights another important 
feature of HARA preferences. Moreover, linear risk tolerances can be interpreted as a first or-
der Taylor series approximation of arbitrary risk tolerances thus emphasizing the high practi-
cal relevance of HARA utility. Thereby, we must have  1 ab W 0 + ⋅>  for all possible terminal 
wealth levels. According to (3), this condition is necessary for simultaneously guaranteeing 
1 U'(W) 0 >  and  1 U''(W) 0 <  for all W1, that is positive and decreasing marginal utility and 
therefore risk-averse behavior. In Breuer and Gürtler(2005) the requirement  1 ab W 0 +⋅ > is 
analyzed in more detail. As parameters a and b can assume arbitrary values as long as we al-
ways have  1 ab W 0 +⋅ >, HARA utility functions describe situations with falling (b < 0), ris-
ing (b > 0) and constant (b = 0) risk tolerance. Thereby falling (rising) risk tolerance is 
equivalent to rising (falling) absolute risk aversion. 
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As already pointed out by Hakansson(1969) and Stiglitz(1970), classes of HARA utility func-
tions comprise exponential, logarithmic, and power utility functions and can be completely 
described in the following way: 
  (a,b) 1 1
1
U( W ) e x p W ,
a
⎛⎞ =− − ⋅ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
     b = 0; 












 otherwise (b ∈ ℜ \ {0, 1}).  
Using (3) and (4) as well as the abbreviation 
  00 z( ( 1x ) W ) / ( ab W( 1R ) ) =−⋅ + ⋅⋅ +  (5) 
in Appendix A it is shown that 
 
0
(a,b) 1 (1,b) f P
W( 1R )
U( W ) e x p U( z ( y r( 1 y ) r ) ) ,
a
⋅+ ⎛⎞ =− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
  b = 0;  




(a,b) 1 0 (1,b) f P U( W )( a b W ( 1 R ) ) U( z ( y r( 1 y ) r ) ) ,
−
=+ ⋅⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅  otherwise (b ∈ ℜ \ {0, 1}). 
Since positive marginal utility in the case of an exclusive riskless investment requires a posi-
tive value of  0 ab W( 1R ) +⋅ ⋅ + , the maximization of  (a,b) 1 E[U (W )] can be replaced by the 
maximization of  
   (1,b) f P E[U (z (y r (1 y) r ))] ⋅ ⋅+− ⋅ . 
For any given fund f, the above expectation is maximized with respect to y and z and does not 
depend on the investor's initial endowment W0 or preference parameter a any more. It is obvi-
ous that this result immediately implies the well-known two-funds separation theorem men-
tioned earlier. In what follows these optimal values of y and z (as well as other corresponding 
optimal values) are indicated by an asterisk.   
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From all funds under consideration the investor will select that one with the highest attainable 
value of 
  (1,b) f P E[U (z (y r (1 y) r ))] ⋅ ⋅+− ⋅ . 
In the case of quadratic utility this leads us to the realization of the maximum Sharpe ratio by 
the optimal combination of a fund f and the portfolio P of equity shares as has already been 
described by Jobson and Korkie(1984). Brennan and Solanki(1981) derived a similar result 
for situations with lognormally distributed security returns and risk neutral market valuations. 
 
We therefore introduce the following definition. 
 
Definition 1. Consider an investor with HARA utility facing the portfolio selection problem 
described at the beginning of section 2. Also define U as U(1,b). The quantity 
  ⋅⋅+−⋅ = fP E[U(z (y r (1 y)r ) ) ] G S M(y,z) ,s a y,  ( 7 )  
is defined as the generalized Sharpe measure for the portfolio structure (y,z). 
 
This definition leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. An investor with a HARA utility function facing the portfolio selection problem 
defined above will rank funds according to the maximum values of GSM( y,z )for each fund. 
 
Proof. See derivation above. 
 
Certainly, y should be restricted to avoid situations where a fund or the reference portfolio P 
of direct stock holding is sold short by the investor. To analyze the characterization of possi-
ble border solutions with respect to y we have to introduce the following new lemma.   
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Lemma. Let f be a fund with  ≠ fP E[r ] E[r ] and define z( y) as the optimal value of z for 
given fund f and share y of the fund f in the risky portfolio . The following statements obtain. 
(i)  z(y) has a unique root  =− PPf ˆ y E[r ]/(E[r ] E[r ]).  
(ii)  The sign of z(y) equals the sign of  ⋅ +−⋅ fP yE [ r] ( 1 y )E [ r]  for all y. 
(iii)  The sign of the derivative  = ∂∂ ˆ y y z( y)/ y  equals the sign of  − fP E[r ] E[r ]. Thus, if 
< > fP E[r ] E[r ], it follows: 
> <
1
ˆ y0 ,  
> < z( y) 0  for all  < ˆ yy  and 
< > z( y) 0 for all  > ˆ yy .   
(iv)  =⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ fP GSM( y,z( y)) E[U( z( y) ( y r (1 y) r ))]  has a unique (unrestricted) maxi-
mum at a value 
* y  and a unique (unrestricted) minimum at  ˆ y . 
(v) 
∈
⋅− < ⇒ =
**
y [0, 1]






z( y ) y 0 arg max[GSM( y,z( y))] 0 . 
 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
 
Let optimal values for y and z (as well as other variables) in the case of x ∈ ℜ and y ∈  ] y , y [ 
( ℜ ∈ y , y ) be characterized by two asterisks ** while a single asterisk denotes optimal solu-
tions for x, y ∈ ℜ. According to part (v) of the Lemma we get a border solution 
** y1 =  in the 
case of a restriction y ≤ 1 if the investor would – without this restriction – prefer to sell the 
equity portfolio short. To see this it is necessary to recognize that we have 
**
() () z(y ) 0 x(y ) 1
>< <⇒ >  and that we get 
* y1 >  or 
* 1y 1 − >  for 
* z(y ) 0 <  from part (ii) of the 
Lemma. This implies that situations with 
* z(y ) 0 >  and 
* 1y 0 − <  as well as situations with   
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* z(y ) 0 <  and 
* 1y 0 −>  are characterized by the optimality of short sales of (only) equity 
portfolio P if possible. Consequently, the introduction of short sales restrictions in such a 
situation then thus leads to a border solution 
** y1 = . Exactly this relationship is described by 
the first line of part (v) of the Lemma. As shown by Sharpe(1966), for quadratic utility the 
setting y = 1 implies the ranking of funds according their simple Sharpe measure. We there-
fore may speak of the generalized Sharpe measure (for HARA utility) of a fund f in the fol-
lowing sense. 
 
Definition 2. The special case 
  = ⋅ f GSM(1,z(1)) E[U( z(1) r )]  (8) 
is called the generalized Sharpe measure of a fund f. 
 
The second line of part (v) of the Lemma characterizes a situation where it is best for the in-
vestor to invest nothing in fund f. However, there may be situations where the investor wants 
to realize a (marginal) minimum positive engagement in funds so that the domain of y is then 
[ε, 1] with ε > 0. Under such circumstances an unrestricted optimal positive investment in f 
leads to  ε =
* *
f y . In this case it is possible to derive a simpler performance measure than the 
one presented in Proposition 1. To do so, we just have to look at the investor's utility depend-
ing on y for optimal choice z(y):  
  fP U(z(y) (y r (1 y) r )) U(r(y)), say. ⋅⋅+−⋅ =  (9) 
For  y0 =ε→  the investor's expected utility converges to the same value  P E[z(0) r ] ⋅  for any 
fund under consideration. Thereby, z(0) corresponds with that value z in the case y = 0 that 
leads to the maximum expected value of the utility function 
  (1,b) f P E[U (z (y r (1 y) r ))] ⋅ ⋅+− ⋅ .   
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Since no dependency on the elected fund is recognizable, z(0) is equal for all funds. In order 
to compare funds f with y0 =ε→  we thus have to derive E[U(r(y))] with respect to y at y = 
0. We get  
 




E[U'(z(0) r ) (( z(y)/ y) r z(0) (r r ))]
y








since  PP E[U'(z(0) r ) r ] 0 ⋅⋅=  according to the first-order necessary condition for z(0). 
 
As a result of part (ii) of the Lemma the sign of z(0) is positive. According to Appendix C, a 
fund g with y = yg and z(y) = zg(y) is thus better than a fund h for yg = yh = ε → 0 with y = yh 
and z(y) = zh(y) if the following relationship holds:  
 
gP g hP h
gP g hP h
gP hP
gP P hP P
E [ U ' ( z( 0 )r)r] E [ U ' ( z( 0 )r)r]
cov[U'(z (0) r ),r ] cov[U'(z (0) r ),r ]
E[r ] E[r ] E[r ] E[r ].
cov[U'(z (0) r ),r ] cov[U'(z (0) r ),r ]





In the case of quadratic utility function (11) becomes the original Jensen measure. (11) there-
fore suggests the following definition. 
 
Definition 3. The quantity  
  − ⋅= ff P P E[r ] E[r ] GJM, β  say,  (12) 





cov[U'( z(0) r ),r ]
cov[U'( z(0) r ),r ]
 
is called a generalized Jensen measure for HARA utility. 
 
The generalized Jensen measure is already known in the literature and may be interpreted as 
the marginal expected utility from adding a small fraction of a fund f to a reference portfolio   
   13
P as has been pointed out by e.g. Grinblatt and Titman(1989), p. 407, for the special case of 
quadratic utility, and in general by Leland(1999), pp. 28, 33. It is interesting to note that this 
measure should only be used to rank funds f which are inferior in such a sense that the inves-
tor would prefer to sell them short. All other funds are better than those inferior ones and will 
be ranked separately according to the performance measure of Proposition 1 (possibly allow-
ing for border solutions 
** y1 =  in the case of unrestricted optimal values 
* y1 > ). Such funds 
are called superior ones.  
 
Since inferior funds are optimally sold short, they are characterized by a negative Jensen 
measure, while GJM > 0 holds for all funds f in which the investor prefers a positive holding. 
Furthermore, a negative sign of the reversed Jensen measure  PP ff E[r ] E[r ] −β⋅  shows us that 
we have a border solution 
** y1 =  for the investors would like to sell portfolio P short. Sum-
ming up, the generalized Jensen measure and its reversed formulation make it possible to eas-
ily check for any fund f whether there will be a border solution with 
** y =ε > 0 or 
** y1 =  or 
not. 
 
Finally, the performance measure according to Definition 3 belongs to the class of period 
weighting measures introduced by Grinblatt and Titman(1989) if we interpret period weights 
as marginal utilities. This follows immediately from the analysis in Grinblatt and Tit-
man(1989), p. 407. The performance measure according to Proposition 1 does not belong to 
the class of period weighting measures as shown in Appendix D. As a by-product we get the 
following general assessment of the usefulness of period weighting measures for fund per-
formance issues in our model. As in Grinblatt and Titman(1989), period weighting measures 
can be effectively used to identify superior funds since these funds are unambiguously charac-
terized by a positive sign of their Jensen measures. In contrast to Grinblatt and Titman(1989)   
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this does not rely on multivariate normal return distributions. Moreover, in order to determine 
a complete funds ranking, period weighting measures can only be applied to rank inferior 
funds, but not the superior ones. For our context, period weighting measures thus lack general 
applicability. Summarizing, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. Consider an investor with HARA utility and facing a portfolio selection prob-
lem as described at the beginning of section 2. with short sales restrictions y ∈ [ε, 1], ε > 0, 
but small. Funds which should optimally be sold short are inferior compared to all other 
funds and can be identified by their negative generalized Jensen measure. They should be 
ranked separately behind the other funds according to the generalized Jensen measure. Any 
other fund has to be characterized by the generalized Sharpe measure of the optimal combi-
nation of this fund f and equity portfolio P. Funds which lead to optimal short sales of the eq-
uity portfolio P are characterized by a negative reversed generalized Jensen measure. For 
them performance evaluation reduces to the generalized Sharpe measure according to Defini-
tion 2. In the case of quadratic utility functions all generalized performance measures can be 
simplified to their counterparts based on a quadratic utility function. 
 
Proof. See derivation above. 
 
In an identical manner to its equivalent based on a quadratic utility function the generalized 
Jensen measure can easily be manipulated by the variation of a fund's engagement in riskless 
lending or borrowing. There are several possibilities in order to neutralize the influence of 
such manipulations. The most straightforward way seems to introduce normalized funds 
which are characterized by the same expected excess return µ° > 0. To this end, any fund f 
must be combined with riskless borrowing/lending by the investor in a certain way just ren-  
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dering fund managers' endeavors to influence their Jensen measure by riskless borrow-
ing/lending useless. To be precise, funds f are substituted by portfolios f° which consist of a 
fraction  ff x ( E [ r] )/E [ r] °= −µ °  that is invested in riskless lending and a fraction 1x −°  which 
is invested in the original fund f so that for  ff r( 1 x ) r ° = −° ⋅ we get  f E[r ] ° =µ°. The resulting 
normalized funds f° may then be ranked according to the generalized Jensen measure of 
Definition 3. Since their expected return is identical for all funds the following transformation 
of their generalized Jensen measure is possible according to Appendix E: A fund g is better 




g g PP h h PP
E[r ] E[r ]





−β ⋅ > −β ⋅
⇔− >−  (13) 
For quadratic utility the denominators of the fractions in the last line of (13) become the well-
known Treynor ratio. The derivation of (13) thus suggests the following definition. 
 
Definition 4. The quantity 
  = ff P E[r ]/ GTM, β  say,  (14) 
with βfP defined as in Definition 3 is called a generalized Treynor measure for fund f in the 
case of HARA utility. 
 
Proposition 3. The generalized Jensen measure of Definition 3 for normalized funds leads to 
a ranking of funds according to the negative inverse of the generalized Treynor measure of 
the original funds. If we assume beta coefficients to be greater than zero then a direct ranking 
according to the generalized Treynor measure evolves. 
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Proof. See (13). The last line can easily be transformed to  g gP h hP E[u ]/ E[u ]/ β β > , if both 
beta coefficients (and expected excess returns) are positive. 
 
Proposition 3 in connection with Proposition 2 gives us a remarkable justification for the ap-
plication of the original as well as the generalized Treynor measure. It turns out to be an ade-
quate performance measure in the case of (exogenously given) marginal funds engagements 
when assuring invariance of ranking with respect to funds' riskless lending or borrowing. To 
be precise, (original) funds f should be ranked according to the negative inverse of the gener-
alized Treynor measure if we postulate y = ε for all (normalized) funds f°. In particular, this 
implies that all funds with negative performance measure GTM are better than all those with 
positive signs for GTM and each of these subsets of funds can be separately ranked according 
to GTM. The reason for the superiority of negative Treynor measures is that for positive ex-
pected excess returns they coincide with negative beta values so that their contribution to total 
portfolio risk is negative and therefore advantageous. 
 
Once again, the (negative inverse of the) generalized Treynor measure of Definition 4 belongs 
to the class of period weighting measures according to Grinblatt and Titman(1989), but only 
with respect to our newly defined normalized funds f° as is shown in Appendix D. 
 
3. Performance evaluation in the special case of cubic HARA utility 
Though quite general, the performance measures developed in section 2. lack some transpar-
ency. This is in particular true for the generalized Sharpe measure of a combination of a fund 
f with the reference portfolio P. Jobson and Korkie(1984) showed that in the case of quadratic 
utility and absence of short sales restrictions the performance measure according to Proposi-
tion 1 can be reduced to a ranking by the square of the Treynor/Black measure. Unfortunately,   
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there seems to be no straightforward way to extend their results to the general case of HARA 
utility. For more transparent results, the set of admissible preferences must therefore be nar-
rowed.  
 
The most natural way to generalize traditional mean variance analysis is by additionally al-
lowing for skewness preferences. In connection with HARA utility this implies considering 
cubic utility functions. The assumption of cubic utility enables us to give a more specific de-
scription of the Sharpe measure of the optimal combination of a fund f and equity portfolio P 
as described in Proposition 1. Moreover, we are able to relate the generalized Treynor meas-
ure for cubic HARA utility to the performance measure developed by Prakash and Bear(1986) 
on the basis of the Three-Moment CAPM by Kraus and Litzenberger(1976). Thereby, we give 
an example for the analysis of possible connections between a partial-analytical framework 
for the development of performance measures and a capital-market oriented equilibrium ap-
proach to performance measurement. 
 
3.1. The Sharpe measure for optimal fund engagements 
For cubic HARA utility the corresponding transformed
1 utility function U is 
 
3
fP U(r(y,z)) (z (y r (1 y) r ) 1) . =⋅⋅+−⋅ −  (15) 
In this situation we get the following formula for E[U(r(y,z))] which is proven in Appendix 
F. 
 




E[U(r(y,z))] (z 1) 3 (z 1) z z
(,,) , s a y .
=⋅ µ − + ⋅ ⋅ µ − ⋅ ⋅ σ + ⋅ γ
=Φµ σ γ
 (16) 
q µ , 
2
q σ , and 
3
q γ  denote the corresponding first three moments of  q r  . The third central moment 
3 γ  characterizes the skewness of a random variable and its relevance is a direct implication of 
the assumption of a cubic rather than of a quadratic utility function. It is easy to show that   
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formula (16) is decreasing in 
2
q σ . Moreover, as long as we have x < 1, i.e. no riskless lending 
financed by short sales of risky assets, (16) is increasing in  q µ  and 
3
q γ . A proof of these asser-
tions and an explanation of the relevance of skewness considerations as a consequence of the 
assumption of a cubic rather than a quadratic utility function are given in Appendix G. With 
equation (16) we can prove the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4. For cubic HARA utility the Sharpe measure of optimal fund engagements ac-
cording to Definition 1 in a situation without short sales restrictions can be simplified to the 
following special cubic performance measure 
⋅ −−⋅ −⋅ −+ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅+
=
++ ⋅
23 1 . 5 3 3 3 2
* 11 2 221 1 1
12 33 2
12 1
2( 1 ) ( 3 ) 2( 3 1 )
CSM ( , )
(3 )
αα α ααα α α
αα
αα α
 ( 17) 
with α1 defined as  q* q* / µ σ  and α2 as  q* q* / γ σ . In this context q
* identifies the optimal struc-
ture of the overall portfolio’s risk component with excess return  = ⋅+− ⋅
**
q* f P ry r ( 1 y ) r .  The 
same holds true if we take short sales restrictions explicitly into account. For such a situation, 




Proof. See Appendix H. 
 
The performance measure according to Proposition 4 is lengthy, but its calculation is not dif-
ficult, because it only depends on two arguments. The first,  1q * q * / α =µ σ , is just the simple 
quadratic Sharpe measure of the optimal portfolio 
* q . The performance measure of Proposi-
tion 4 may be viewed as a generalization of this quadratic measure to the cubic case and is 
thus called the cubic Sharpe measure CSM
* of the optimal portfolio.   
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Since we already know that preference values ceteris paribus are increasing with higher val-
ues for  q* µ  and smaller values for  q* σ , we can immediately conclude that the generalized per-
formance measure of Proposition 4 is increasing in  1 α  as well. This implies that in the case of 
constant values for  q* γ  which corresponds with decision making on the basis of pure mean-
variance preferences the performance measure of Proposition 4 is equivalent to a funds rank-
ing on the basis of  1q * q * / α= µ σ . As mentioned earlier, the relevance of this measure for per-
formance evaluation in the case of simple mean-variance preferences was demonstrated in 
Jobson and Korkie(1984). 
 
As an extension to the results in Jobson and Korkie(1984) the second argument  2 α  deter-
mines the assessment of any fund f and relates the skewness of the optimal portfolio's return 
to its standard deviation. Once again, we know that the performance measure must be increas-
ing in this argument because it is increasing in  q* γ  (if we abstract from the somewhat patho-
logical case x
* > 1 mentioned above in which an investor sells risky assets to finance riskless 
lending). A fund g with  1g , 1 α= α  and  2g , 2 α =α  is unambiguously better than a fund h with 
1h , 1 α= α  and  2h , 2 α= α  if we have  1 , h 1 , g α > α  and 2 , h 2 , g α > α . No unambiguous relationship 
can be derived for cases where we have  1 , h 1 , g α > α  and  2 , h 2 , g α < α  or  1 , h 1 , g α < α  and 
2 , h 2 , g α > α . In fact, as presented in Appendix I we may easily find examples where such sce-
narios lead to higher or to lower performance evaluations when switching from fund g to fund 
h. All these relationships hold still true if we refer explicitly to situations with short sales re-
strictions. 
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3.2. Cubic Treynor measure and Prakash and Bear(1986) 
If all investors are risk averse and possess cubic utility functions of the HARA type, for any 
risky asset f according to Kraus and Litzenberger(1976) the following relationship must hold 
in capital market equilibrium: 
 
2
f1 f M 2f fM M E[r ] cov[r ,r ] E[(r E[r ]) (r E[r ]) ] =λ ⋅ +λ ⋅ − ⋅ −  (18) 
λ1 and λ2 are market constants which depend on the aggregated risk preferences of all inves-
tors in the capital market. Since risk averse investors with cubic HARA utility functions are 
variance averters but skewness lovers, λ1 is positive and λ2 negative as has been shown e.g. 
by Kraus and Litzenberger(1976), p. 1088. Equation (18) can be considered a generalized cu-
bic security market line because when coskewness 
2
ff MM E[(r E[r ]) (r E[r ]) ] −⋅ −  or λ2 is zero, 
the security market line given by the standard CAPM evolves. Following, Prakash and 
Bear(1986) we define η (< 0) as the quotient λ1/λ2 and rewrite (18) as 
  
2
f2 f M f fM M
f
2 2
fM f f M M
E[r ] ( cov[r ,r ] E[(r E[r ]) (r E[r ]) ] )
E[r ]
,
( cov[r ,r ] E[(r E[r ]) (r E[r ]) ] )
=λ ⋅ η⋅ + − ⋅ −
⇔= λ
η⋅ + − ⋅ −
 (19) 
Let us now allow for possible deviations of funds f from the cubic security market line (19). 
On this basis Prakash and Bear(1986) suggested to rank funds according to the fraction on the 
left-hand side of the last equation in (19). 
 
Definition 6. The left-hand side of the last equation of (19) is called the Prakash/Bear per-
formance measure PBM. 
 
In Appendix J it is shown that in the special case of a cubic (HARA-) utility function the 
funds ranking according to Proposition 3 can be transformed in the following way   





gg PP P P g z(0)
g
2 2
hh PP P P h z(0)
h
E[(r E[r ]) (r E[r ]) ] 2 E[r ] cov[r ,r ]
E[u ]
E[(r E[r ]) (r E[r ]) ] 2 E[r ] cov[r ,r ]
,
E[r ]
−⋅ − + ⋅− ⋅




which corresponds to the inverse of the Prakash/Bear performance measure of Definition 6 if 
we use the market portfolio M as the portfolio P of equity shares and apply the definition 
  M 2( E [ r] 2 / z ( 0 ) ) , ⋅− = η  say.  (21) 
Thereby, it is worth mentioning that the consideration of cubic utility of the HARA type in 
connection with only marginal fund engagements is consistent with the validity of the gener-
alized security market line (18) for all equity shares. Capital market equilibrium will not be 
disturbed by funds deviating from the generalized security market line as long as their impor-
tance is negligible. Because of the two-funds separation by Hakansson(1969) and Cass and 
Stiglitz(1970), the consideration of investors with marginal fund engagements, cubic HARA 
utility, and homogeneous expectations (regarding equity shares) immediately leads to the 
Three-Moment CAPM by Kraus and Litzenberger(1976) as characterized by (18) and (19) 
with respect to equity shares. In such a scenario η as defined by (21) must indeed be identical 
to the fraction  2 1 /λ λ  as implied by the generalized security market line (19). In this sense, 
capital-market oriented equilibrium approaches to performance measurement turn out to be 
special cases of the partial-analytical approach favored in this paper. Moreover, it seems to us 
that the partial-analytical framework is much more transparent than the equilibrium approach. 
 
The parameter z(0) has to be determined by the implicit definition  /y 0 ∂Φ∂=  for the special 










=⋅  (22)     








MM M M MM E[r ] E[(r E[r ]) ] 3 E[r ] var[r ] E [r ] =− + ⋅⋅ + . (24) 
Thus, by (22) and (21) it is easy to determine η empirically. 
 
We summarize our findings of this subsection in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5. In the case of cubic HARA utility the negative inverse of the generalized Trey-
nor measure leads to the same funds ranking as the inverse of the Prakash/Bear performance 
measure. 
 
Proof. See derivation above. 
 
Among other things, Proposition 5 implies that a ranking according to the original 
Prakash/Bear performance measure typically totally reverses funds ranking according to the 
negative inverse of the generalized Treynor measure and thus selects that fund which (after 
normalization) leads to the lowest increase in utility when marginally added to the market 
portfolio M (or, more generally, to P). We consider such a ranking not very reasonable and 
therefore favor the performance measures derived in this paper.  
 
4. Empirical Example 
To exemplify our results, we consider a German investor who is planning to select one fund 
investing in German (British, French) equity shares and to combine this fund optimally with a 
given naive diversified direct investment on the German (British, French) capital market. We   
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focus on the comparison of funds rankings based on quadratic and cubic (HARA) utility and 
generally speak of quadratic and cubic performance measures, respectively. Specifically, we 
consider quadratic as well as cubic Sharpe, Jensen, Treynor and optimized performance 
measures with exclusion of short sales and the quadratic Treynor/Black performance measure. 
Thereby, when applying optimized performance measures, inferior funds are separately 
ranked via (the negative inverse of) their Treynor measures. We refrain from computing op-
timized performance measures without short sales restrictions because of the obvious high 
practical importance of this limitation and because otherwise inferior funds would become 
very attractive only because of the possibility of being sold short. 
 
The starting point of our analysis is monthly (post tax) return data for 45 German, 36 British, 
and 24 French funds over a period from June 1994 to July 1999 which are calculated on using 
the respective monthly repurchase prices (in Deutschmarks) per share. This means that possi-
ble selling markups are not taken into account. In this respect, the performance of funds gen-
erally tends to be overestimated when compared to the performance of any reference index. 
However, the determination here (in accordance with many other approaches) of gross per-
formance measures allows at least some conclusions to be made with regard to the sensitivity 
of ranking when different types of performance measures are applied. Exactly this aspect 
forms the central issue of this paper. 
 
We assume that all earnings paid out to the investors by a fund f are reinvested in this fund. 
As proxies of diversified direct capital markets investments we use the DAX 100 for Ger-
many, the FTSE 100 for the UK, and the France CAC 40 for France. The DAX 100 (listed un-
til 03/21/2003) consisted of 100 continuously traded shares of German companies including 
the 30 blue chips of the DAX 30 and the 70 midcap-stocks of the MDAX. Based on special   
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criteria (e.g. that at least 25 % of the stock in issue must be publicly available for investment 
and must not be in the hands of a single party or parties acting in concert) the FTSE 100 com-
prises the largest 100 UK companies ranked by market value. A sample of 40 French stocks 
listed on the so-called Monthly Settlement Market (also known as the RM or the Règlement 
Mensuel) constitutes the CAC 40 index. Moreover, it is noteworthy that for the time period 
under consideration there existed index certificates with respect to all three indices thus mak-
ing a monetary engagement in them indeed rather easy.
2 
 
The riskless interest rate R is approximated by the expected return of German time deposit 
running for one month and covering the respective period of time to be observed. Funds of 
each country are analyzed separately. 
 
At the end of each month from July 1997 to July 1999 we estimate expectation values, vari-
ances, covariances, skewnesses and co-skewnesses on the basis of historical return data for 
the preceding 36 months and use these estimators in order to determine a ranking of funds for 
the following month as investment period and given performance measure. This gives 25 dif-
ferent funds rankings for the funds and for any performance measure under consideration. We 
thus allow for the problem of time-varying moments of return distributions. 
 
We refrain from considering a more recent time interval as in the aftermath of the global stock 
market crash in 2000 there have been too few funds being able to earn positive average excess 
returns. Historical return data would not be suitable for the estimation of return moments in 
such a situation. As our aim is to give an example of the consequences of different measures 
for fund performance and not to develop new methods of return estimation we focus on pre-
crash stock market data.   
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We determine the average ranking position of every fund f (and the respective reference port-
folio P of direct capital market engagements) for all quadratic or cubic performance measures 
under consideration. As an example, for German funds these average ranking positions are 
presented in Table 1. Corresponding tables for British and French funds are available from the 
authors on request. 
 
Table 1 
Average ranking positions of German funds according to several performance measures 
 
Since investors are mainly interested in superior funds as defined above and the optimized 
performance measures with border solutions of inferior funds reduce to simple rankings ac-
cording to the (negative inverse of the) Treynor measure, further analysis focuses on the best 
ten German (British, French) funds (possibly including the corresponding reference portfolio 
P) according to the optimized cubic performance measure with short sales restrictions. In Ta-
ble 1, German top ten funds are shaded. 
 
Based on the average ranking positions of these top ten funds we are able to calculate ranking 
correlation coefficients between any pair of the performance measures under consideration as 
Table 2 displays. Moreover, as in practical applications funds are very often ranked according 
to their average past relative wealth increase (net of fund inflows and outflows) we allowed 
for funds rankings according to their simple average excess return. Henceforth, we call this 
the risk neutral performance measure and Table 2 presents average ranking correlation coeffi-
cients for the risk neutral performance measure as well. 
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Table 2 
Ranking correlation coefficients between various performance measures for German, 
British, and French funds (top ten funds)  
 
As Table 2 shows there may be considerable differences in funds ranking according to the op-
timized quadratic performance measure and the simple quadratic Sharpe, Treynor, or Jensen 
measure. The same holds true with respect to cubic measures. These findings are indicated by 
the shaded numbers at the intersection of the lines belonging to SM
** (quadratic utility) and 
SM
** (cubic utility) and the columns for the Sharpe, Jensen, and Treynor measure. 
 
Moreover, we can identify similarly significant differences in funds rankings according to the 
(quadratic or cubic) optimized performance measure and the Treynor/Black measure as is in-
dicated by the shaded numbers in the column belonging to the Treynor/Black measure. This is 
not too surprising since the latter one has been derived from portfolio optimization without 
short sales restrictions and thus can lead to considerable deviations from funds rankings 
which explicitly allow for such kind of restrictions. Summarizing, the consideration of opti-
mized performance measures can be recommended for this example, because this requires 
similar return information than the corresponding Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen measure, but 
additionally leads to a portfolio-theoretically based funds ranking. 
 
In addition, Table 2 can be used for a comparison between rankings according to the quadratic 
performance measures and their respective cubic counterparts. In fact, as can be seen by ex-
amining the relationship between quadratic and cubic Treynor as well as Jensen measure for 
British funds, it is obvious that deviations in ranking can be of a similar size as the differences 
between rankings according to (quadratic, cubic) optimized and (quadratic, cubic) Sharpe,   
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Treynor, and Jensen measures. Furthermore, optimized funds rankings for quadratic and cubic 
optimized performance measure differ to some degree, too, as can be seen by the three shaded 
numbers at the intersections of the row belonging to SM
** (quadratic utility) and the column 
belonging to SM
** (cubic utility). Because of these findings, it seems to be indeed reasonable 
to explicitly recognize skewness preferences in funds rankings as well. This conclusion is in 
line with several other analyses regarding portfolio optimization which were mentioned in the 
introduction. 
 
Finally, risk neutral funds rankings differ considerably from funds rankings according to the 
optimized cubic utility. This is verified by the shaded cells at the intersection of the rows be-
longing to linear utiliy and the columns belonging to SM
** (cubic utility) and may indicate 
significant welfare losses resulting from fund selection according to their historical average 
excess return instead of a selection on the basis of the optimized cubic performance measure 
when utility is in fact cubic and of the HARA type. 
 
Nevertheless, a simple comparison of funds rankings according to different performance 
measures does not reveal the precise amount of possible welfare losses from the application of 
an unsuitable performance measure. To do so, an analysis of attainable certainty equivalents 
is required. Thereby, for the case of German funds we want to compute relative losses in cer-
tainty equivalents for an investor with cubic HARA utility who acts according to an inade-
quate portfolio selection rule. In order to calculate expected utility levels and certainty equiva-
lents it is not sufficient to determine which fund is chosen according to different performance 
measures. Additionally, it must also be fixed how this fund is combined with the reference 
portfolio P and riskless lending or borrowing. To this end, we identify the application of the 
quadratic Sharpe measure with a situation in which the investor assumes a setting y = 1 and   
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combines a fund f with riskless lending or borrowing based on a quadratic utility function. 
The quadratic Jensen measure as well as the quadratic Treynor measure can be interpreted as 
situations with a restriction y = ε > 0, but small, and – once again – quadratic utility. Cubic 
Sharpe, Jensen and Treynor measure describe decision situations with corresponding settings 
for y but cubic utility. For all 25 portfolio selection problems from July 1997 to July 1999 we 
determine optimal portfolios based on the rules just described and compute resulting certainty 
equivalents for an investor whose utility function is actually cubic (and of the HARA type). 
Certainly, there are greater certainty equivalents achievable by portfolio selection according 
to the optimized cubic performance measure and with a restriction y ∈ [0, 1] instead of y = 1 
or y = ε so that we express all resulting certainty equivalents as percentages of this attainable 
maximum value. Besides quadratic and cubic Sharpe, Jensen, and Treynor measure we also 
consider the optimized quadratic measure for which we assume portfolio selection with a re-
striction y ∈ [0, 1] based on quadratic utility. Furthermore, we consider portfolio selection 
based on expected excess returns. Since risk neutrality would not lead to an inner solution for 
an investor’s riskless lending or borrowing we assume risk neutral fund selection and the 
choice y = 1 but a quadratic utility for the determination of the amount of the riskless invest-
ment. 
 
Unfortunately, in the case of linear and quadratic utility approximation resulting relative cer-
tainty equivalents depend on the fraction a/W0 and thus are not independent of preference pa-
rameter a and initial wealth W0 any longer. Therefore, average relative certainty equivalents 
over 25 periods each are presented in Table 3 for three cases of small, medium-level and high 
values of a/W0. Thereby, increasing values of a/W0 imply ceteris paribus greater risk toler-
ance. Details are presented in Appendix L. Because of the two-funds separation relative risk   
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discounts resulting from cubic performance measures are independent of the investor’s risk 
tolerance. 
 
The procedure just described relies on the ex ante determination of certainty equivalents. For 
each of 25 portfolio selection problems over the whole time period return distributions for the 
computation of certainty equivalents are assumed as given ex ante based on the results of the 
corresponding past 36 months.  
 
Nevertheless, it is also possible to estimate relative certainty equivalents based on ex post per-
formance of different portfolio selection rules. For illustrative purposes we also compute the 
relative certainty equivalent of the optimized quadratic performance measure based on ex post 
performance. This means we use the 25 ex post return realizations resulting from 25 applica-
tions of the optimized quadratic performance measure as an estimator for the investor’s port-
folio return distribution in the case of such a portfolio selection behavior. The same is done 
for the application of the optimized cubic performance measure leading to a relative certainty 
equivalent for the optimized quadratic performance measure based on ex post performance re-
sults of only about 1/7 ≈ 14.29 % for low investor’s risk tolerance expressing a welfare loss of 
about 1−0.1429 = 85.71 %. Apparently, this result based on ex post performance complies 
very well with the corresponding number in Table 3 based on ex ante distributions. 
 
Table 3 
Average relative certainty equivalents attainable by the application of different perfor-
mance measures when utility is actually cubic and of the HARA type  
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In fact, as can be learnt from Table 3 both the risk neutral performance measure and all quad-
ratic ones may lead to considerable welfare losses for an investor with actual cubic HARA 
utility. The same holds true for the application of the cubic Jensen and Treynor measure. Wel-
fare losses from linear or quadratic utility approximation are increasing with ceteris paribus 
smaller risk tolerance. In fact, this specific result corresponds perfectly to the findings by 
other authors like Levy and Markowitz(1979) who have been cited in the introduction. 
 
Nevertheless, (in contrast to the cubic Treynor and Jensen measure) the simple cubic Sharpe 
measure together with the ad hoc restriction of y = 1 does a good job since in the case of 
(only) short sales restrictions the setting y = 1 is indeed typically the optimal solution for the 
top ten funds under consideration. After all, this examination of certainty equivalents seems to 
verify the relevance of cubic performance measures instead of the approximative use of deci-
sion rules based on risk neutral or quadratic preferences. If an investor is only interested in the 
determination of the best fund out of a set of F funds, the application of the cubic Sharpe 
measure might be used as an approximation of the optimized cubic performance measure. 
Nevertheless, the utilization of both performance measures requires the same information if 
the investor wants to optimize the overall portfolio consisting of a fund f, the reference portfo-
lio P and riskless lending or borrowing. From this point of view we recommend once again 
the direct application of the optimized cubic performance measure. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper was motivated by the question how the portfolio-theoretic approach by Jobson and 
Korkie(1984) for performance evaluation could be extended to allow for short sales restric-
tions and be broadened in order to allow for preferences beyond mean-variance. By doing so, 
we were able to generalize the performance measures of Treynor(1965), Sharpe(1966), and   
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Jensen(1968) to the case of HARA utility and give a portfolio-theoretic foundation for all of 
these measures. Moreover, we related our work to the approaches by Prakash and Bear(1986) 
and Grinblatt and Titman(1989). We extended the notion by Grinblatt and Titman(1989) of a 
period weighting measure to identify superior funds to all classes of HARA utility functions 
and arbitrary return distributions. We also showed that for the special purpose of funds rank-
ing period weighting measures are only apt to rank inferior funds. The ranking of the more in-
teresting other funds cannot be based on a period weighting measure. Finally, we presented a 
brief empirical application of the performance measures under consideration which indicates 
the relevance of portfolio-theoretically founded performance measures recognizing skewness 
preferences. 
 
Certainly, we have to admit that the performance measures developed in this paper are based 
on purely theoretical considerations and that there is a gap between the methods that are 
newly derived in academic journals and those that are often used in practice. For this reason 
we took into account the risk neutral performance measure which is based on historical aver-
age fund returns and which seems to be the most relevant criterion for fund selection in prac-
tical application. Obviously, for an investor with cubic HARA utility and a one-period time 
horizon the utilization of this simple risk-neutral performance measure may lead to consider-
able welfare losses. As a consequence, we believe there are indeed situations in which the per-
formance measures developed in this paper may add value to investors. However, the main 
contribution of this paper is new theory while the task of making the methods developed in 
this paper fully operational in practice certainly is a separate project which should be ad-
dressed by future work.   
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1 Notice, that U(1,−0.5)(.) and 1.5⋅U(1,−0.5)(.) are equivalent because of the cardinality of Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Because of a similar reason, it is here possible to re-
define z for the derivation of Proposition 4 as one half of the original decision variable z (i.e. 
0.5⋅z is simply replaced by z). 
2 For further information on these indices see e.g. http://www.finix.at and particular for the 
former DAX 100 see Deutsche Boerse Group(2003), p. 6. 
 
References 
Bodie, Z, A Kane and A J Marcus(2005) Investments, 6th ed., McGraw-Hill, Boston et al. 
Borch, K(1960) Reciprocal Reinsurance Treaties, ASTIN Bulletin, 1, 170-191. 
Brennan, M J and R Solanki(1981) Optimal Portfolio Insurance, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 16, 279-300. 
Breuer W and M Gürtler(2001) Hedging in Incomplete Markets: An Approximation Proce-
dure for Practical Application, Journal of Futures Markets, 21, 599-631. 
Breuer W and M Gürtler(2005) Two-Funds Separation and Positive Marginal Utility, unpub-
lished Working Paper, RWTH Aachen. 
Cass D and J E Stiglitz(1970) The Structure of Investor Preferences and Asset Returns, and 
Separability in Portfolio Allocation: A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Mutual 
Funds, Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 122-160. 
Chunhachinda, P, K Dandapani, S Hamid and A J Prakash(1997), Portfolio Selection and 
Skewness: Evidence from International Stock Markets, Journal of Banking and Finance, 
21, 143-167.   
   33
 
Deutsche Boerse Group(2003), Leitfaden zu den Aktienindizes der Deutschen Börse − Versi-
on 5.1, Gruppe Deutsche Börse Information Services. 
Dittmar, R(2002) Nonlinear Pricing Kernels, Kurtosis Preference and Cross-Section of Equity 
Returns, Journal of Finance, 57, 369-403. 
Dybvig, P H and S A Ross(2003) Arbitrage, State Prices, and Portfolio Theory, (Constanti-
nides, G M, Harris M, and R M Stultz Editors), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 
North-Holland, 605-637.  
Fletcher, J and J Kihanda(2005) An Examination of Alternative CAPM-Based Models in 
U.K. Stock Returns, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, forthcoming. 
Grinblatt M and S Titman(1989) Portfolio Performance Evaluation: Old Issues and New In-
sights, Review of Financial Studies, 2, 393-421. 
Hakansson N H(1969) Risk Disposition and the Separation Property in Portfolio Selection, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 8, 401-416. 
Harvey C R and A Siddique(2000) Conditional Skewness in Asset Pricing Tests, Journal of 
Finance, 55, 1263-1295. 
Hlawitschka W(1994) The Empirical Nature of Taylor-Series Approximations to Expected 
Utility, American Economic Review, 84, 713-719. 
Jensen M C(1968) The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1956-1964, Journal of Fi-
nance, 23, 389-416.  
Jobson J D and B Korkie(1984) On the Jensen Measure and Marginal Improvements in Port-
folio Performance: A Note, Journal of Finance, 39, 245-251.  
Kraus A and R H Litzenberger(1976) Skewness Preference and the Valuation of Risk Assets, 
Journal of Finance, 31, 1085-1100.    
   34
 
Kroll Y, H Levy and H M Markowitz(1984) Mean-Variance versus Direct Utility Maximiza-
tion, Journal of Finance, 39, 46-61.  
Levy H and H M Markowitz(1979) Approximating Expected Utility by a Function of Mean 
and Variance, American Economic Review, 69, 308-317. 
Leland H E(1999) Beyond Mean-Variance: Performance Measurement in a Nonsymmetrical 
World, Financial Analysts Journal, 54, (January/February), 27-36. 
Lintner J(1965) The Valuation of Risk and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Port-
folios and Capital Budgets, Review of Economics and Statistics, 47, 13-37. 
Mossin J(1966) Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Pricing Market, Econometrica, 34, 768-783. 
Patton A J(2004) On the Out-of-Sample Importance of Skewness and Asymmteric Depend-
ence for Asset Allocation, Journal of Financial Econometrics, 2, 130-168. 
Prakash A J and R M Bear(1986) A Simplifying Performance Measure Recognizing Skew-
ness, Financial Review, 21, 135-144.  
Sharpe W F(1964) Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of 
Risk, Journal of Finance, 19, 425-442.  
Sharpe W F(1966) Mutual Fund Performance, Journal of Business, 39, 119-138.  
Tobin J(1958). Liquidity Preference as Behaviour Towards Risk, Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 25, 65-86.  
Treynor J L(1965) How to Rate Management of Investment Funds, Harvard Business Review 
43,(January/February), 63-75.  
Treynor J L and F Black(1973) How to Use Security Analysis to Improve Portfolio Selection, 
Journal of Business, 46, 66-86.   
   1
Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Proof of (6) 
 
Case b = 0: 
         
() ()




U (W ) exp W exp W (1 R (1 x) (y r (1 y) r ))
aa
11
exp W (1 R) exp W (1 x) (y r (1 y) r )
aa
1





  = − −⋅ = − −⋅ ⋅++−⋅⋅+−⋅  
 
    = − −⋅ ⋅+ ⋅ − −⋅ ⋅− ⋅ ⋅+− ⋅    
   
 = − −⋅ ⋅+ ⋅ − − ⋅⋅+− ⋅ 





Case b = 1: 
 





0( 1 , b ) f
U (W ) ln(a W ) ln(a W (1 R (1 x) (y r (1 y) r )))
W( 1x ) ( y r ( 1y ) r )
ln (a W (1 R)) 1
aW( 1R )
ln(a W (1 R)) ln(1 z (y r (1 y) r ))
ln(a W (1 R)) U (z (y r (1
= +=+ ⋅ + + − ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅
  ⋅− ⋅⋅+− ⋅
=+ ⋅ + ⋅ +    +⋅ +  
=+ ⋅ + + + ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅
=+ ⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅ + P y) r )). −⋅
 (A.A2) 
 





(a,b) 1 1 0 f P (2)
1









U( W ) ( a b W ) ( a b W ( 1 R ( 1 x ) ( y r ( 1 y ) r ) ) )
b1 b1
W( 1x ) ( y r ( 1y ) r ) 1
(a b W (1 R)) 1 b
b1 ab W( 1R )
1






= ⋅ +⋅ = ⋅ +⋅ ⋅+ +− ⋅ ⋅+− ⋅
−−
 ⋅− ⋅⋅+− ⋅
=+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅+ ⋅  −+ ⋅ ⋅ + 








0( 1 , b ) f P
)
(a b W (1 R)) U (z (y r (1 y) r )).
−
−
=+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅⋅ + −⋅
 
   (A.A3)   
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Appendix B: Proof of the Lemma 
 
First of all, the investor faces the optimization problem  
  fP z, y E[U(z (y r (1 y) r ))] max.! ⋅⋅+−⋅ →  (A.B1) 
Thus, the corresponding necessary conditions are as follows:  
  fP fP E[U'(z (y r (1 y) r )) (y r (1 y) r )] 0, ⋅⋅+−⋅ ⋅⋅+−⋅ = (A.B2) 
  fP f P E[U'(z (y r (1 y) r )) z (r r )] 0. ⋅⋅+−⋅ ⋅ ⋅− = (A.B3) 
 
(i): 
A value of zero for z leads to a modification of (A.B2) as follows:  fP E[U'(0) (y r (1 y) r )] ⋅⋅+−⋅  
= 0. This equality is fulfilled if and only if  fP y E[r ] (1 y) E[r ] 0 ⋅ +−⋅ =. This in turn is equiva-
lent to  PPf y E[r ]/(E[r ] E[r ]) =−  and thus the statement of (i) is proven.  
 
(ii): 
By the use of the necessary condition (A.B2) z is implicitly defined. Since we have E[V1⋅V2] 




c o v [ U ' ( z ( y )( yr ( 1 y )r) ) , yr ( 1 y )r]
E[U'(z(y) (y r (1 y) r ))] E[y r (1 y) r ].
⋅⋅+−⋅ ⋅+−⋅
=− ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅
 (A.B4) 
As a consequence of positive marginal utility we have E[U'(.)] 0 > . Therefore, the right-hand 
side of (A.B4) has the opposite sign of  fP y E[r ] (1 y) E[r ] ⋅ +−⋅ . Since  ' U  is a decreasing func-
tion, the sign of the left-hand side of (A.B4) is positive for z(0) < 0 and negative for z(0) > 0. 
This means that it is the opposite of the sign of z(0). Since the signs of the left-hand side and 
the right-hand side of (A.B4) must be equal, so must be the signs of z(0) and of 
fP y E[r ] (1 y) E[r ] ⋅+ − ⋅.   
   3
(iii): 
In the case  Pf E[r ] E[r ] >  statement (i) leads to  fPPf ˆ y E[r ]/(E[r ] E[r ]) 1 = −>  and in the case 
Pf E[r ] E[r ] <  the inequality  fPPf ˆ y E[r ]/(E[r ] E[r ]) 0 =− <  is true. Moreover, with 
  fP fP E[U'(z (y r (1 y) r )) (y r (1 y) r )] F(y,z), ⋅⋅+−⋅ ⋅⋅+−⋅ =  say  (A.B5) 
we get from (A.B2) under consideration of  ˆ z(y) 0 =  the equality F( ˆ y, ˆ z(y)) = F( ˆ y,0) = 0. 
Application of the Implicit Function Theorem
1 (with r(y) as a shortcut for  f z(y) (y r ⋅⋅+  
P (1 y) r ) −⋅) yields 
 
ˆ (y,z) (y,0) fP fP
2
fP ˆ y ˆ (y,z) (y,0)
fP
2 ˆ r(y) 0
fP
F/ y ˆˆ ˆ E[U''(r(y)) (r r ) r(y) U'(r(y)) (r r )] z
ˆˆ ˆ y F/ z E[U''(r(y)) (y r (1 y) r ) ]
U''(0) 0 U'(0) (E[r ] E[r ])
.




∂∂ ⋅−⋅ + ⋅− ∂
=− =−
∂∂ ∂ ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅
⋅+ ⋅ −
=
−⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅
 (A.B6) 
Since the denominator and  ) 0 ( ' U  are positive, the sign of  ˆ yy z/ y| = ∂ ∂  corresponds with the 
sign of  fP E[r ] E[r ] − . Finally, following (i) z has a unique zero at  ˆ y implying all further state-
ments of (iii).  
 
(iv): 
From portfolio theory we know
2 that the problem  
 
fP
ff PP , E[U( r r )] max.!
ξξ ξ ⋅+ ξ ⋅ →  (A.B7) 
owns a unique maximum and no other local extrema. This problem is equivalent to problem 
(A.B1) if the potential solution of no risky engagement (z = 0) is excluded. For z ≠ 0 the sum 
P f ξ + ξ  corresponds with z and  ) /( P f f ξ + ξ ξ  equals y. Thus, there are only two candidates 
for a local extremum: the unique maximum of the problem mentioned above and (y,z) = 
( ˆ y,0).  
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To analyze the second potential extremum we have to form the first and the second partial de-
rivative of  fP GSM(y,z(y)) E[U(z(y) (y r (1 y) r ))] =⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ :  
  fP fPf P
fP f P (A.B2)
GSM(y,z(y))
y
E [ U ' ( z ( y )( yr ( 1 y )r) )( (z /y )( yr ( 1 y )r) z ( y )( r r) ) ]
E[U'(z(y) (y r (1 y) r )) z(y) (r r )]
∂
∂
= ⋅⋅+− ⋅ ⋅∂∂⋅⋅+− ⋅ + ⋅ −






fP f P fP
GSM(y,z(y),y)
y
E[U''(z(y) (y r (1 y) r )) (( z/ y) (y r (1 y) r ) z(y) (r r ))
z(y) (r r )] E[U'(z(y) (y r (1 y) r )) ( z/ y) (r r )].
∂
∂
= ⋅⋅+− ⋅ ⋅∂∂⋅⋅+− ⋅ + ⋅ −
⋅⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ∂ ∂ ⋅ −
 (A.B9) 
Obviously we get  ˆ yy GSM(y,z(y))/ y 0 = ∂∂ = . Moreover, 
 
2
ˆ yy f P 2 (iii)




=⋅ + ⋅ ∂ ∂ ⋅ − >
∂
, (A.B10) 
so that GSM(z(y),y) has a local minimum in  ˆ y. Since there are only two potential extrema 
the local minimum as well as the local maximum are unique.  
 
(v): 
To prove this statement we distinguish between two cases.  
 
Case 1: 
* z(y ) 0 >  
 
Let 
* y0 <  (
** z(y ) y 0 ⇒⋅ < ). Firstly, let  Pf E[r ] E[r ] > . Following (iii) we get  ˆ y1 >  and thus 
* ˆ yy < . According to (iv) GSM(y,z(y)) is strictly decreasing on the interval 
* ˆ [y , y] [0,1] ⊃ .  
 
Secondly, let  Pf E[r ] E[r ] < . Part (iii) leads to  ˆ y0 < . We do not have 
* ˆ yy <  since this state-
ment corresponds with 
* z(y ) 0 <  according to (iii) and is therefore not treated in Case 1. Us-  
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ing (iv) again we get that GSM(y,z(y)) is strictly decreasing on 
* [y , ) [0,1] ∞⊃ . Hence, we 
have characterized the monotonic behavior of GSM(y,z(y)) and shown that 
** y0 =  is the 
optimal restricted engagement.  
 
Now look at 
* y1 >  (
** z(y ) (1 y ) 0 ⇒⋅ − < ). Again we firstly analyze  Pf E[r ] E[r ] >  so that (iii) 
leads to  ˆ y1 > . Analogously to the proof above we get 
* ˆ yy <  according to (iii) and Case 1 
since 
* ˆ yy >  does not correspond with Case 1. Using (iv) GSM(y,z(y)) is strictly increasing 
on 
* (, y ] [ 0 , 1 ] −∞ ⊃ .  
 
Let secondly  Pf E[r ] E[r ] < . From (iii) we know  ˆ y0 <  and thus 
* ˆ yy < . According to (iv) 
GSM(y,z(y)) is strictly increasing on the interval 
* ˆ [y, y ] [0,1] ⊃ . Consequently, the deriva-
tive of GSM(y,z(y)) has a positive sign on 
* (0, y )  and this leads to 
** y1 =  to be the optimal 
restricted engagement.  
 
Case 2: 
* z(y ) 0 <  
 
We immediately get from (ii) 
**
fP y E[r ] (1 y ) E[r ] 0 ⋅+ − ⋅<  and 
* y[ 0 , 1 ] ∉  respectively. Espe-
cially 
** z(y ) y 0 ⋅<  corresponds with 
* y1 >  and 
** z ( y)( 1 y) 0 ⋅ −<  complies with 
* y0 < .  
 
Firstly, the case 
* y0 <  is treated (
** z(y ) (1 y ) 0 ⇒⋅ − < ). The assumption  Pf E[r ] E[r ] >  leads 
to  ˆ y1 >  and consequently 
* ˆ yy <  which in turn implies 
* z(y ) 0 >  according to (iii). This is 
inconsistent with Case 2.  
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Consequently, we have  Pf E[r ] E[r ] < . This also implies  ˆ y0 <  and because of 
* z(y ) 0 <  and 
(iii) it follows 
* ˆ yy < . Thus, GSM(y,z(y)) is strictly increasing on  ˆ [y, ) [0,1] ∞ ⊃  and 
** y1 =  
is the optimal engagement.  
 
Secondly, we suppose 
* y1 >  (
** z(y ) y 0 ⇒⋅ < ). From  Pf E[r ] E[r ] >  it follows  ˆ y1 >  using 
(iii) and because of 
* z(y ) 0 <  and (iii) also the statement 
* ˆ yy <  is true. Thus, GSM(y,z(y)) 
is strictly decreasing on  ˆ (, y ] [ 0 , 1 ] −∞ ⊃  and 
** y0 =  is optimal in the restricted case.  
 
Finally,  Pf E[r ] E[r ] <  cannot occur, since (iii) leads to  ˆ y0 <  and thus 
* ˆ yy >  and according to 
(iii) especially to 
* z(y ) 0 > , which is not consistent with the assumption of Case 2. 
 
Appendix C: Proof of (11) 
 
From (10) we know that fund g is better than fund h for yg = yh = ε → 0 if 
  Pg Ph E[U'(z(0) r ) r ] E[U'(z(0) r ) r ] ⋅ ⋅> ⋅ ⋅ . (A.C1) 
Because of cov[V1,V2] = E[V1⋅V2]−E[V1] ⋅E[V2] for arbitrary random variables V1 and V2, 
we have  Pf P f P f cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ] E[U'(z(0) r ) r ] E[U'(z(0) r )] E[r ] ⋅ =⋅ ⋅ −⋅ ⋅ . Inequality (AC.1) is 




E[U'(z(0) r )] E[r ] cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ]
E[U'(z(0) r )] E[r ] cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ].
⋅⋅ + ⋅
>⋅ ⋅ + ⋅
 (A.C2) 




cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ] cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ]
E[r ] E[r ] .




 (A.C3)   
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Further, we know  PP P P P P cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ] E[U'(z(0) r ) r ] E[U'(z(0) r )] E[r ] ⋅= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅  and (from 




cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ] cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ]
E[r ] E[r ] E[r ] E[r ].






Appendix D: Proof that the generalized Sharpe measure of optimal portfolio structure 
** (y ,z ) (Proposition 1) and the Treynor measure (Definition 4) do not belong to the class 
of period weighting measures 
 
Let rP,t and rf,t be the excess returns of portfolio P and of fund f, respectively, from time t−1 to 
t. Following Grinblatt and Titman(1989) the period weighting measure PWM of a fund f can 





PWM p lim (r ,T) r
→∞
=
= −ω⋅ ∑ . (A.D1) 
In this context the terms ω(rP,t,T) characterize arbitrary weights that only depend on rP,t and T 
and thus are independent of the realizations rf,t for any fund f at any point in time t. It is suffi-
cient to show that the quadratic optimized Sharpe measure does not belong to the class of pe-
riod weighting measures. According to Jobson/Korkie(1984) (in the case without short sales 
restrictions) this measure is equivalent to the (square of the) Treynor/Black measure. It thus 
suffices to show that the latter one does not belong to the class of period weighting measures. 
This in turn can be explained by using the quadratic Jensen measure. The Jensen measure is a 
period weighting measure as was shown by Grinblatt and Titman(1989)
3 and the correspond-
ing period weights are  
 
2
PP , t P P
P,t 2
P
ˆ (T) (r r (T)) r (T)
(r ,T)




, (A.D2)   
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with  P r (T) and 
2
P ˆ (T) σ  defined as 
T
P,t t1 (1/ T) r
= ⋅∑  and 
T 2
P,t P t1 (1/ T) (r r (T)) ,
= ⋅− ∑  respectively, 
as the estimators of the expected excess return and the excess return variance. The (quadratic) 
Treynor/Black measure is defined as the quotient of the quadratic Jensen measure and the 
variance  fP var[ ] ε  of the error term from a linear regression of rf on rP thus depending on the 
fund's excess return rf. These statements and the definition of the period weighting measure 
lead to a dependency of potential weights ω ˆ  for forming the Treynor/Black measure on the 
excess returns rf,t of fund f so that a representation like (AD.1) (with weights ω ˆ  being inde-
pendent of rf) is not possible for this measure.  
 
The same arguments can be given for the quadratic Treynor measure since the following 




GTM E[r ] =+
β
. (A.D3) 
Consequently, since weights according to (AD.2) are independent of rf potential weights for 
the quadratic Treynor measure must be depending on rf. 
 
Appendix E: Proof of (13) 
 
If we rank normalized funds according to the generalized Jensen measure a fund g is better 
than a fund h if   




g g PP h h PP
gP hP E[r ] E[r ]





E[r ] E[r ] E[r ] E[r ]
cov[U'(z(0) r ),(1 x ) r ] cov[U'(z(0) r ),(1 x ) r ]
cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ] cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ]










−β ⋅ > −β ⋅
⇔β< β
















E[r ] E[r ] 0
cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ]
(1 x )
0) r ),r ] cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ]

















 	    




Appendix F: Proof of (16) 
 
Using the (exact
4) Taylor series expansion around  r E[r(y,z)] µ , =  say, we get the following 
formula for 
3





U(r(y,z)) U( ) U'(µ ) (r(y,z) µ )
11
U''( ) (r(y,z) µ ) U'''( ) (r(y,z) µ ) .
26
=µ + ⋅ −
+⋅ µ⋅ − +⋅ µ⋅ −
 (A.F1) 
Based on (AF.1) it follows: 
 
23
rr r r r
32 3
rr r r





E[U(r(y,z))] U( ) U''( ) U'''( )
26
(1 ) 3 (1 )
(z 1) 3 (z 1) z z
(,,) .
=µ + ⋅ µ ⋅ σ + ⋅ µ ⋅ γ
=µ− +⋅µ− ⋅ σ+ γ
=⋅ µ − + ⋅ ⋅ µ − ⋅ ⋅ σ + ⋅ γ
=Φµ σ γ
 (A.F2)   
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Appendix G: Proof of the relevance of skewness in the case of cubic rather than quad-
ratic utility and monotonic dependency of (16) regarding to  q µ , 
2
q σ  and 
3
q γ  
 
If we assume a quadratic (HARA) utility function U (i.e. b = −1 ) expected utility can be cal-
culated as 
2
fP E[U(r(y,z))] E[(z (y r (1 y) r ) 1) ] =− ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ − . Again, using the (exact) Taylor se-














(z 1) z .
= µ+⋅ µ⋅ σ
= −µ − − ⋅ ⋅ σ
= −⋅ µ − − ⋅ σ
 (A.G1) 
Thus, in contrast to the cubic case skewness plays no role in situations with quadratic utility. 
In addition we get the following partial derivatives of (16): 
 
23












3z( z 1 ) 3z z( 3( z 1 ) 3z ) ,
(,,)
3( z 1 )z,
(,,)
z.
∂Φ µ σ γ
= ⋅⋅ ⋅ µ− +⋅ ⋅ σ= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ µ− +⋅ ⋅ σ
∂µ
∂Φ µ σ γ
=⋅⋅ µ −⋅
∂σ




Further,  rr q 0 U''( ) 6 ( 1) 6 (z 1), > µ=⋅ µ − =⋅ ⋅ µ −  so that the second equality of (A.G2) implies 
23
qq q (µ , , ) Φσ γ  to be decreasing in 
2
q σ . For x < 1, i.e. no riskless lending financed by short sales 
of risky assets, (5) leads to z > 0. Under consideration of this property the first and the third 
equality of (A.G2) result in 
23
qq q q (,,) / 0 ∂Φ µ σ γ ∂µ >  and 
23 3
qq q q (,,) / 0 ∂Φµ σ γ ∂ γ > . 
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Appendix H: Proof of Proposition 4 
 
For given optimal value 
* y  we can determine the corresponding solution for z by deriving 
(16) with respect to z for 
* yy = . The necessary condition  * yy /z 0
= ∂Φ∂ =  leads to the follow-
ing solution: 
 
22 2 2 2 3
q* q* q* q* q* q* q*
22 42 2 3
q* q* q* q* q* q* q*
32 3
q* q* q* q*
!






= ⋅ ⋅µ − ⋅µ + ⋅µ ⋅ ⋅σ + ⋅ ⋅µ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅σ + ⋅ ⋅γ =
∂
µ+ σ±σ− σ⋅ µ− γ⋅ µ
⇔=
µ+⋅ σ⋅ µ+ γ
(A.H1) 
Φ is a polynomial of third order in z with leading coefficient 
32 3
q* q* q* q* 3 µ +⋅ σ⋅ µ+ γ, so that we 
have to distinguish between a positive sign and a negative sign of this term. In the first case 
the local maximum of Φ obviously is smaller than the local minimum which implies z
−  to de-
termine the local maximum. In the second case the local minimum of Φ is smaller than the lo-
cal maximum. But in this case the denominator of (A4) has a negative sign whereby zz
− + >  
and again the local maximum is characterized by z
− . Substitution of z
−  in (16) gives
5  
 
( ) ( )
33 2 2
q* q* q* q* q*
33 2
q* q* q* q*
q* q* q*
63 3 3 2 4 2 6 4 2 23 1 . 5
q* q* q* q* q* q* q* q* q* q* q* q* q* q*
32 3 2
q* q* q* q*
33 6 4 1 . 5
q* q* q* q*
(,,)
(3 ) 2 ( 3 ) 2 ( )
(3 )
323 1 2 ( ) 1
γµ µ µ µ
σ σσ σ
Φµ σ γ
−γ +γ ⋅µ − ⋅γ ⋅σ ⋅µ − ⋅ ⋅σ ⋅µ +σ + ⋅ σ −σ ⋅µ −γ ⋅µ
=
µ+⋅ σ⋅ µ+ γ











q* q* q* q* q* q* q* q











( ) ( ( )( )3) 2 ( 3 ( )1 ) 2 ( 1 ( ) ( ) )





γγµ µ µ µ µ γ





−⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ − − ⋅
=
++ ⋅
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With  1q * q * / α= µ σ and  2q * q * / α= γ σ we immediately get the measure of Proposition 4. The 
same holds true for y = y
** and thus q = q
**, that is, in the case of the explicit recognition of 
short sales restrictions. 
 
Appendix I: Examples for increasing (scenario 1) and decreasing (scenario 2) optimal 
cubic performance when switching from a fund g with αg,1 and αg,2 to a fund h with αh,1 
> αg,1 and αh,2 < αg,2. 
 
fund  q* µ   q* σ   q* γ   1 α   2 α   CSM* 
g  10 %  10 %  −20 %  1.0  −2.0  −0.672 
h (scenario 1)  20 %  10 %  −50 %  2.0  −5.0  −0.660 
h (scenario 2)  20 %  10 %  −60 %  2.0  −6.0  −0.719 
When we compare fund g and fund h in both scenarios, we have  1 , h 1 , g α < α  and  2 , h 2 , g α > α . 
But in the first case the performance measure rises from approximately −0.672 to −0.66 while 
it declines from approximately −0.672 to −0.719 in the second case. 
 
Appendix J: Derivation of (20) 
 
As z(0) is positive and the second derivative of U is negative, we have a negative (and fund-
independent) value of  PP cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ] ⋅  as well. Using the definition of  fP β  inequality (13) 




cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ] cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ]
.
E[r ] E[r ]
⋅ ⋅
>  (A.J1) 
In the special case of the cubic (HARA-) utility function
6  3 ) 2 W ( ) W ( U − =  we get 
2 ) 2 W ( 3 ) W ( ' U − ⋅ =  and consequently   
   13
 
22
Pf P f P f cov[U'(z(0) r ),r ] 3 z(0) cov[r ,r ] 12 z(0) cov[r ,r ] ⋅= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ . (A.J2) 







ff PP P P
22
ff P P P Pff
0
2
ff PP P ff PP
cov[r ,r ]
E[(r E[r ]) (r E[r ])]
E[(r E[r ]) (r 2 r E[r ] E [r ])]
E[(r E[r ]) (2 r E[r ] E [r ])] E[r ] E[r E[r ]]




=− ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅+
+− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅− −⋅ −
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Summarizing, for 
3 ) 2 W ( ) W ( U − =  (A.J1) is equivalent to 
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Appendix K: Derivation of (22), (23), and (24)  
 
The derivation of  fP GSM(y,z) E[U(z (y r (1 y) r ))] =⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅  with respect to z for given value y 
leads to the following first-order necessary condition for z(y):  
  fP fP E[U'(z (y r (1 y) r )) (y r (1 y) r )] 0. ⋅⋅+−⋅ ⋅⋅+−⋅ = (A.K1) 
The parameter z(0) is thus determined by the implicit definition (A.K1) for the special case y 
= 0. With y 0 =  and 
3 ) 2 W ( ) W ( U − =  formula (A.K1) becomes:   
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Since ) 0 ( z  characterizes a maximum of  P E[U(z r )] ⋅  for give value y = 0, the second-order 
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z(0) E[r ] 2 E[r ] 0
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≥⋅ <  
 (A.K3) 
Because of the requirement (A.K3),  ) 0 ( z  is obviously always identical to  ) 0 ( z
−  in (A.K2). 
With 
22
PP P E[r ] var[r ] E [r ] =+  and (A.J3) we get 
32 2
PP P P P E[r ] cov[r ,r ] E[r ] E[r ] =+ ⋅  
33
PP P P P E[(r E[r ]) ] 3 E[r ] var[r ] E [r ]. =− + ⋅⋅ +  Now using the market portfolio M as reference 
portfolio P leads to the postulated results. 
 
Appendix L: Determination of small, medium-level and great values of an investor’s risk 
tolerance and computation of relative certainty equivalents according to Table 3 
 
First of all we have to analyze the connection between parameter a in the quadratic case 
(aquadr) and parameter a in the cubic case (acub). If we look at cubic preferences we are allowed 




(a , 0.5) 1 cub 1
32 2 3
cub cub 1 cub 1 1
1.5 U (W ) (a 0.5 W )
a 3 a 0.5 W 3 a 0.25 W 0.125 W .
− ⋅= − − ⋅
=− + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅
 (A.L1)   
   15
In addition we assume that the considered approximative quadratic utility function will be 
generated from cubic utility by deleting the cubic terms in (A.L1). Thus, the relevant quad-
ratic utility function has the form 
 
22
1 cub 1 cub 1
22
cub cub 1 cub
U(W ) 3 a 0.5 W 3 a 0.25 W
0.75 a [(a W ) a ].
=⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −⋅ ⋅ ⋅
=− ⋅ ⋅ − −
 (A.L2) 
Because of the cardinality of utility functions we are able to substitute the utility function 
(A.L2) by 
2
1c u b 1 U(W ) (a W ) =− −  which is a quadratic HARA utility function with aquadr = 
acub. Thus we have to identify acub with aquadr = a. 
 
For given value of y according to the decision rule under consideration denote zquad as the op-
timal value for z in the case of quadratic utility. In addition, define zcub as the corresponding 
value for z in the case of cubic HARA utility which would lead to the same riskless invest-
ment as for zquad and quadratic utility. From (5) we know 
    quad 0 quad 0 cub 0 cub 0 z ((1 x) W ) /(a W (1 R)), z ((1 x) W ) /(a 0.5 W (1 R)) =−⋅ −⋅ + =−⋅ −⋅⋅ + . (A.L3) 
 









(a/W ) 0.5 (1 R) (a/W ) (1 R) z
(a/W ) (1 R)
z2 z . .
2( a / W) ( 1 R )
   −−
=    −⋅ + − +   
 −+
⇔= ⋅ ⋅− + 
 (A.L4) 
 
From this we get zcub = 2⋅zquad for a/W0 = 0 and zcub = zquad for a/W0 → ∞. However, we have 
to allow for the restriction a/W0 > 1+R so that the term in brackets on the right-hand side of 
(A.L4) can only obtain values between 0 and 0.5 and is monotone increasing in a/W0. As 
a/W0 → 1+R implies the optimality of sole riskless lending, we consider − somewhat arbitrar-  
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ily − situations with zcub = 2⋅zquad⋅0.05= 0.1⋅zquad, zcub = 2⋅zquad⋅0.25 = 0.5⋅zquad and zcub = 
2⋅zquad⋅0.45= 0.9⋅zquad. Thereby, we implicitly define risk tolerance measured by a/W0 for 
given value of R. The greater zcub/zquad, the greater is ceteris paribus an investor’s risk toler-
ance. Based on y and zcub we are then able to compute the resulting investor’s certainty 
equivalent according to the transformed utility function (AL.1). We come to relative certainty 
equivalents according to Table 3 by dividing the certainty equivalents resulting from the ap-
proximative solution y and zcub by maximum achievable certainty equivalents when directly 
maximizing expected cubic (HARA) utility (AL.1). As we consider 25 periods of fund selec-






                                                 
Endnotes (relating to the appendices) 
1 See e.g. Ingersoll, J. E., Jr., (1987), Theory of Financial Decision Making (Rowman and Lit-
tlefield Publishers Inc., Maryland), p. 3. 
2 See again e.g. Ingersoll, (1987), p. 65. 
3 See Grinblatt and Titman(1989), p. 407 in connection with formula (11) on p. 405. 
4 The Taylor series expansion is exact because all derivatives of the utility function of fourth 
or higher order are zero. 
5 The first equality can be checked with a Software like Mathematica or Maple. 
6 Again, as in connection with formula (15) (see endnote 1 of our paper), we use an equivalent 
utility function U(.) = 12 ⋅ U(1,−0.5)(.). Table 1 
Average ranking positions of German funds according to several performance measures 
Ranking positions are presented for different performance measures. Performance measures under 
consideration comprise the Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen measure for quadratic as well as cubic (HARA) 
utility, the quadratic Treynor/Black measure (TB) and the optimized quadratic or cubic performance 
measure (SM
**) in the case of short sales restrictions. Top ten funds are shaded. 
    quadratic utility  cubic utility 
 fund  name  Sharpe  Treynor  Jensen  TB  SM
** Sharpe  Treynor  Jensen SM
** 
1 Aberdeen Global German Eq  46  46 46 44 46 46  46  46 46
2 AC  Deutschland  27 24 24 24 24 26 24 24 24
3 ADIFONDS  21 22 22 22 22 20 21 22 21
4 Baer Multistock German Stk A  6  6 8 8 6 6  6  6 6
5 Baring German Growth  11  4 2 9 7 9  4  3 7
6 BBV Invest Union  7  9 9 7 8 7  9  9 8
7 CB Lux Portaolio Euro Aktien  35  38 38 40 38 33  37  38 38
8 Concentra  26 27 28 29 28 23 27 27 27
9 CS EF (Lux) Germany   39  40 40 38 40 39  40  40 40
10 DekaFonds  30 33 33 34 33 31 31 32 32
11 DELBRÜCK Aktien UNION-Fonds  45  45 45 45 45 45  45  45 45
12 Dexia Eq L  Allemagne C  40  41 41 41 41 40  41  40 40
13 DIT Fonds für Vermögensbildung  31  28 27 26 27 29  28  28 28
14 DIT Wachstumfonds  5  8 7 4 5 5  8  6 5
15 DVG Fonds SELECT INVEST  8  10 10 5 9 8  10  10 9
16 DWS  Deutschland  13 14 14 14 14 13 14 14 14
17 EMIF Germany Index plus B  43  44 44 46 44 43  44  44 44
18 Fidelity Fds Germany  22  21 21 21 21 22  22  21 22
19 Flex  Fonds  44 43 43 43 43 44 43 43 43
20 Frankfurter Sparinvest Deka  24  25 25 25 25 24  25  25 25
21 FT Deutschland Dynamik Fonds  18  18 18 17 17 18  17  17 17
22 Gerling  Deutschland  Fonds  38 32 29 30 30 38 34 30 30
23 HANSAeffekt  25 26 26 27 26 27 26 26 26
24 Hauck Main I Universal Fonds  34  34 32 33 32 34  32  33 33
25 Incofonds  1  1 1 2 1 1  1  1 1
26 Interselex Equity Germany B  29  30 31 36 31 30  30  31 31
27 INVESCO GT German Growth C  14  2 4 13 10 15  3  8 10
28 Investa  12 13 13 11 13 12 13 13 13
29 Köln Aktienfonds DEKA  23  23 23 23 23 25  23  23 23
30 Lux  Linea  33 30 35 32 34 36 32 36 36
31 Metallbank Aktienfonds DWS  4  3 6 6 4 4  2  4 4
32 MK  Alfakapital  36 36 39 35 39 35 36 39 39
33 MMWI  PROGRESS  Fonds  28 29 29 30 29 28 29 29 29
34 Oppenheim  Select  37 39 37 37 37 37 39 37 37
35 Parvest Germany C  20  19 19 20 19 21  20  20 20
36 Plusfonds  10 12 11 12 12 11 11 11 11
37 Portfolio Partner Universal G  41  37 34 28 36 41  38  34 35
38 Ring Aktienfonds DWS  9  11 12 10 11 10  12  12 12
39 SMH Special UBS Fonds 1  16  16 16 15 16 14  15  15 15
40 Thesaurus  31 35 36 39 35 32 35 35 34
41 Trinkaus Capital Fonds INKA  14  15 15 16 15 16  16  16 16
42 UniFonds  19 17 17 18 18 19 18 18 18
43 Universal Effect Fonds  42  42 42 42 42 42  42  42 42
44 VERI VALEUR Fonds  3  5 3 3 3 2  5  2 2
45 VICTORIA Eurokapital  2  7 5 1 2 3  7  5 3
P DAX XETRA 100  17  20 20 19 20 17 19 19 19
 Table 2 
Ranking correlation coefficients between various performance measures for German, British, and French funds (top ten funds) 
Performance measures under consideration comprise the Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen measure for quadratic as well as cubic (HARA) utility, the 
quadratic Treynor/Black measure (TB) and the optimized quadratic or cubic performance measure (SM
**) in the case of short sales restrictions. 
Moreover, funds are ranked according to historical average excess return µ. 
    linear utility  quadratic utility  cubic utility 
    µ Sharpe  Treynor  Jensen  TB SM
** Sharpe  Treynor  Jensen SM
** 
 German funds   
linear utility  µ  100.00% 53.37% 10.30% 41.24% 49.09% 41.82% 52.73% 20.00% 43.03% 45.54%
Sharpe  53.37% 100.00% 33.96% 62.38% 83.69% 95.82% 95.82% 40.02% 54.58% 91.61%
Treynor  10.30% 33.96% 100.00% 88.54% -6.67% 55.15% 43.03% 98.79% 89.09% 63.52%
Jensen  41.24% 62.38% 88.54% 100.00% 27.90% 77.62% 66.71% 90.96% 97.03% 83.22%
TB  49.09% 83.69% -6.67% 27.90% 100.00% 73.33% 74.55% -4.24% 18.79% 62.32%
quadratic utility 
SM
**  41.82% 95.82% 55.15% 77.62% 73.33% 100.00% 92.73% 58.79% 68.48% 95.87%
Sharpe  52.73% 95.82% 43.03% 66.71% 74.55% 92.73% 100.00% 49.09% 62.42% 95.87%
Treynor  20.00% 40.02% 98.79% 90.96% -4.24% 58.79% 49.09% 100.00% 91.52% 68.31%
Jensen  43.03% 54.58% 89.09% 97.03% 18.79% 68.48% 62.42% 91.52% 100.00% 79.09%
cubic utility 
SM
**  45.54% 91.61% 63.52% 83.22% 62.32% 95.87% 95.87% 68.31% 79.09% 100.00%
 British funds   
linear utility  µ  100.00% 26.06% 20.87% 20.87% 10.30% 4.36% 4.91% -16.58% -16.36% -3.03%
Sharpe  26.06% 100.00% 13.51% 13.51% 40.61% 59.18% 94.54% 43.82% 39.39% 62.42%
Treynor  20.87% 13.51% 100.00% 100.00% 78.58% 77.99% 0.50% 66.47% 71.22% 62.62%
Jensen  20.87% 13.51% 100.00% 100.00% 78.58% 77.99% 0.50% 66.47% 71.22% 62.62%
TB  10.30% 40.61% 78.58% 78.58% 100.00% 86.58% 22.10% 71.07% 70.91% 72.12%
quadratic utility 
SM
**  4.36% 59.18% 77.99% 77.99% 86.58% 100.00% 50.23% 83.75% 82.85% 92.81%
Sharpe  4.91% 94.54% 0.50% 0.50% 22.10% 50.23% 100.00% 44.87% 40.52% 58.94%
Treynor  -16.58% 43.82% 66.47% 66.47% 71.07% 83.75% 44.87% 100.00% 99.49% 91.20%
Jensen  -16.36% 39.39% 71.22% 71.22% 70.91% 82.85% 40.52% 99.49% 100.00% 89.09%
cubic utility 
SM
**  -3.03% 62.42% 62.62% 62.62% 72.12% 92.81% 58.94% 91.20% 89.09% 100.00%
 French funds   
linear utility  µ  100.00% 26.06% 29.70% 41.82% 28.48% 28.48% 45.54% 34.75% 44.24% 36.97%
Sharpe  26.06% 100.00% 64.85% 67.27% 86.67% 86.67% 88.68% 68.31% 68.48% 75.76%
Treynor  29.70% 64.85% 100.00% 97.58% 89.09% 89.09% 88.68% 98.27% 96.36% 95.15%
Jensen  41.82% 67.27% 97.58% 100.00% 91.52% 91.52% 91.08% 97.07% 98.79% 97.58%
TB  28.48% 86.67% 89.09% 91.52% 100.00% 100.00% 95.87% 92.28% 92.73% 96.36%
quadratic utility 
SM
**  28.48% 86.67% 89.09% 91.52% 100.00% 100.00% 95.87% 92.28% 92.73% 96.36%
Sharpe  45.54% 88.68% 88.68% 91.08% 95.87% 95.87% 100.00% 91.71% 92.28% 94.67%
Treynor  34.75% 68.31% 98.27% 97.07% 92.28% 92.28% 91.71% 100.00% 98.27% 97.07%
Jensen  44.24% 68.48% 96.36% 98.79% 92.73% 92.73% 92.28% 98.27% 100.00% 98.79%
cubic utility 
SM
**  36.97% 75.76% 95.15% 97.58% 96.36% 96.36% 94.67% 97.07% 98.79% 100.00%
 Table 3  
Average relative certainty equivalents attainable by the application of different performance measures when utility is actually cubic and of 
the HARA type 
Attainable average fractions of maximum certainty equivalents for an investor with cubic HARA utility are displayed for the case that the investor 
deviates from the best portfolio consisting of a fund f, the reference portfolio P and riskless lending or borrowing implied by cubic HARA utility. 
Deviations are caused by the application of another performance measure than the optimized cubic performance measure CSM
** (identical to SM
** 
in the line of Table 3 belonging to cubic utility) and comprise the selection of other funds than the best one and the suboptimal combination of this 
fund with reference portfolio P and riskless lending and borrowing. Moreover, the extent of the investor’s welfare loss caused by linear or quadratic 





low medium  high 
linear utility  µ  15.145% 62.167% 86.758% 
Sharpe  16.511% 68.006% 95.110% 
Treynor  11.032% 44.660% 60.448% 
Jensen  11.032% 44.660% 60.448% 
quadratic utility 
SM
**  16.536% 68.095% 95.093% 
Sharpe  99.997% 
Treynor  61.800% 
Jensen  61.800% 
cubic utility 
SM
**  100.000% 
 
 